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Summary findings
Forecasting has long been a challenge and will remain so  Many governments and regulators avoid good demand
for the foreseeable future. But the analytical instrumetits  modeling out of lack of conviction that theory and
and data processing capabilities available through the  models can do better than the "old hands" of the sector.
latest technology and software should allow much better  This is dangerous when privatization changes the nature
forecasting than transport ministries or regulatory  of business.
agencies typically observe.  For projects amounting to investments of $100-200
Privatization brings new needs for demand forecasting.  million, a cost of $100,000-200,000  is not a reason to
More attention  is paid to risk under privatization thaln  reject a reasonable modeling effort. And some private
when investments are publicly financed. And regulators  forecasting firms are willing to sell guarantees or
must be able to judge traffic studies done by operators  insurance with their forecasts to cover significant gaps
and to learn what strategic behavior influenced these  between forecasts and reality.
studies.
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1. Introduction:
While  public-private  partnerships in  the delivery  of transport  infrastructures and
services is  expanding,  there  is  also  growing  evidence of  the  lack  of  appreciation  of  the
importance of demand forecasting in preparing and monitoring these partnerships. This often
gives an opportunity to the private operators of transport services to complain, soon after taking
over  a  business,  about  overestimates  or  underestimates  of  demand  based  on  the  initial
information provided by governments. It tends to result in an excuse for the private operators to
try  to  renegotiate  the  contract  to  improve  its  terms.'  The  most  common  case  finds  a
concessionaire arguing that the "overselling'  of the potential business by a government eager to
maximize  fiscal  gains,  generated unjustified  high  expectations.  And nevertheless  it  is quite
common that both regulators and concessionaires or bidders devote much more money to the
construction costs studies than to the demand analysis--the average ratio quoted among expetrs is
one to five.
The lack of focus on good demand forecasting in the context of an increased role of private
operators and  investors in  the transport sector may be  somewhat counterintuitive. Transport
planners have a long tradition of concern for demand. The analysis of demand has been at the
core of the assessment of national or sectoral policy options, including the introduction of new
transport modes.  But  these  concerns have  generally been  addressed  through  more  "macro"
oriented modeling exercises focusing on identifying broad support for,  or rejection of, policy
alternatives.
In the context of more specific evaluations of projects--such as high speed trains, subways
or new airports-or  in the context of important policy decision regarding modal choices--, many
planners have also developed disaggregated demand models capable of generating the kind of
information much closer to what is needed to meet the forecasting requirements of a project
financier, a privatization commission or a transport economic regulator. There are a few very
good recent surveys of these models (see for instance Small and  Winston (1999) in English,
Quinet (1998) in French)  and  several  comprehensive textbooks on the  subject (Ortuzar and
Willumsen  in  (1994)  in  English  or  Ortuzar  (2000)  in  Spanish).  They  reveal  impressive
improvements  over  the  years  to  model  demand and  increased  accuracy  in  identifying and
assessing the relative importance of  the various factors explaining demand, including modal
shifts resulting from policy changes. Although there is a lot we still don't know, many countries
can now count on useful results on the value of time and the willingness to pay for various types
of  transport service  users. These  are  relevant  indications when  pricing new  services to  be
provided by private operators. 2 It makes sense to compare the tolls or tariffs calculated from the
cost side with these rough estimates of the willingness to pay for some services or with the value
of time revealed by the post-mortem analysis of comparable projects increasingly found in the
literature (see Quinet on Marseille (1998), Small and Winston (1999) on the Dutch data base).
Unfortunately, this improved knowledge does not seem to be spreading to the toolkits used
by transport planners or privatization teams  in developing  countries--and for that matter... in
many developed countries-because  few are willing to  invest in the data needed to make the
IThis  "overselling"  and the  common resulting  renegotiation  of the  terms of the  contract typically  allows th  eprivate operator's  to  obtain
extensions of contract duration, new or larger subsidies and/or lower investment requirements. All these changes alter the fundamental financial
terms of the contracts which often end up being significantly less attractive than anticipated from the viewpoint of the government--and often also
from the view point of the users. On the other hand, new fact sometime do arise and renegotitiation is not necessarily a bad thing, as long as it
follows fair and transparent rules.
2For  a useful overview of how to value time and to relate this to  willingness to pay, see Jara-Diaz, S.R. (2000) or Galvez, T.E. and S.R. Jara-
Diaz (1998)2
most of these new tools. In many cases, "privatization"  has a tight  time table  which does not
allow enough time to get the data and sufficiently work the model. 3 In fact, many academics
would argue that few transport planners have effectively used the most recent developments in
demand modeling techniques. In France, for instance, one of the top transport research centers,
recently published a book taking stock of developments in the field outside of France, arguing
explicitly  that it is  intended to  meet the need  for France to  catch-up in  the area of demand
modeling by urban transport planners. 4
Luckily  for regulators  or project  financiers,  things  are changing.  The best  evidence of
recent progress is that demand forecasting is a profitable business and that many of the firms
offering these forecasting services are willing to stand by their forecast offering guarantees or
insurances to their clients. The US has some good experience but so do Mexico and Brazil who
are relying on serious modeling to assess the future demand for its commuter rail and assess the
government financial support requirements for various levels of tariffs. 5 This market is likely to
grow and there is already  a plethora  of software to pick from, just  like there is a plethora of
methodologies to pick from. The increased availability of private firm willing to offer advise on
demand forecasting will however not  address well the second main  type of error a regulator
needs to  be concerned with: the traffic  modelers often are not  referees, but advocates for the
initial actors' interests as discussed later.
The main  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  guide regulators  though  this  very  technical  and
somewhat foggy field  to  allow them  to  make  the  most  of  new  opportunities  to  collaborate
effectively with specialists. The goal is not to provide a detailed technical introduction but rather
to  provide a  "light"  overview of the  main  issues  a regulator  needs  to  be  aware  in  demand
forecasting.  To achieve this objective the paper is organized as follows. First, it discusses the
changes and challenges brought about by the privatization decision. Privatization introduces a
number of perverse incentives in the process that leads to strategic demand forecast used in the
evaluation of assets by privatization teams. Next it provides a checklist of the most common
problems  with  demand  forecasting,  highlighting  the  main  reasons  why  demand  forecasting
matters in practice. Section 4 then provides a brief overview of the main techniques. Section 5
provides some sector specific illustrations. Section 6 provides some practical tips as how to start
thinking about demand in the context of regulation. Section 7 concludes.
2. The changes brought by the privatization context
This section reviews the main changes resulting from public sector restructuring brought
along privatization. The increased role granted to the private sector does not mean that the public
sector disappears from the sector. In many ways this role is strengthened by the recognition of
the  importance  of  an  independent  regulator.  But  the  implementation  of  a  restructuring  that
recognizes  the importance  of  independent  regulation  requires an  increase  in  the  number of
players  since the policy  and  regulatory  functions  typically  enforced by  an  integrated  public
sector  are  now  assigned  to  an  unbundled  public  sector.  The  regulatory  dimension  of  this
unbundling  is  quite  complex  since  it  provides  a  set  options  which  influence  the  relative
importance of demand forecasting in the context of privatization. A particularly important aspect
3Privatization  is here defined as any type of public-private partnership in which the private sector takes on the main responsibility for the
operation and the investment in the sector. It includes sales/divestitures, concessions/franchises, management contracts and greefield projects. In
developing countries, roughly 66% of the public private partnerships are done through concessions/franchises. For more details see Estache
(2000)
Dossier du Centre d'Etude  sur les Reseaux, les Transports, l'Urbanisme et les Constructions Publ  iques (1998), "Comportement  de deplacement
en milieu urbain: les modeles de choix discret"
5This  is that it is not cheap. Depending on the specifics of a projects at good demand study can cost as much as $250,000 dollars.3
of this choice is the trade-off between the incentives given to the operator to perform well and
the risks that this operator is expected to take on. The specific assignment of responsibility and
of the choice of regulatory instruments are the main reasons for the strategic use of  demand
forecasting by the key players involved in the privatization process as discussed next.
2.1. The diversity of objectives across  actors
In practice, at least four  groups of actors  are involved:  consumers,  operators (in a  large
sense, that is including sponsors and financiers), the government (which represents the taxpayers
and the voters) and the regulator and it is important to understand how their concerns differ. Users
will  worry  about prices,  service  quality  and  reliability.  All  influence  demand.  The  operators
typically  worry  about  profits,  risks  and  market  power. 6 All  are  influenced  by  demand.
Governments, who are often the dominating players in the context of the reform of the sectors
covered  here,  are  generally  interested  in  reducing  the  fiscal  burden  imposed  by  the  public
enterprises of the  sector and  often also try  to generate a  flow of resources through the reform
process. They generally want to please tax payers by cuttting taxes and respond to some of the
constituants with environmental and  distributional concerns. 7 These concerns can both influence
demand and be influenced by demand. In discussing demand forecast key actors are often more
advocates of their agenda than scientifics. Regulators which happen to be the Government officials
or political appointees in many cases, want to balance everybody's  concerns fairly accounting for
many  aspects of demand typically ignored in  the privatization process, including  a  reasonable
comparison  of willingness  and ability to  pay to  avoid,  in particular  in  the case  of passenger
transport, an unfair exclusion of some segments of the population.
2.2. The regulatory regime and the balancing of risks and incentive
Regulatory regimes come in multiple sizes and shapes (rate of return, price cap, hybrids,...)
and have very different effects on the behavior of operators in terms of pricing strategies, quality
or investment decisions. The real importance of demand forecasting in the context of privatization
of local monopolies cannot be appreciated  without a proper recognition of its  relevance for the
effectiveness the regulatory  regime  chosen.  In  turn,  it  is almost  impossible to  understand the
desirable design of the regulatory regime without recognizing that it depends on the ranking of the
various objectives (cost minimization, investment level and speed, social concerns, fiscal goals)
8
reflecting the many concerns of the various actors influenced by the privatization decision. .
From  a  regulatory  viewpoint,  the  regulator  must  chose  who  bears  the  technical  and
commercial risks. This  means balancing  essentially between "fixed  price"  (e.g. toll price  caps
based and lumpsum construction cost contracts which pushes the operators to minimize costs and
contracts, in which both risk types are passed on to the operator) and "cost-plus" type  contracts
(which guarantees that the operator recovers at least cost and make a minimum rate of return on
the business).  If the concern for efficiency dominates and business risks are minor, fixed price
type contracts would dominate all other forms of regulation. Under this regime,  demand would
mostly be the operator's problem since it is supposed to decide autonomously the risks it is willing
to take. It turns out that fixed price contracts are most likely to attract efficient private operators
6Most  regulators would argue that the concems of the financial advisors and of the operators do not always coincide The operators mostly care
about getting the deal signed and this requires very good demand prospects  . The operator wants to have a longer term view and is typically more
cautious about the prospects.
7They  are sometimes as well concerned with the need to deal with unions as the restructuring of these sectors often result in labor redundancies.
8For a longer discussion of  this point, see Crampes and Estache (1998)4
when risk levels are low. This means that the more precise demand is, the lower the risk, and thus
the easier it is to rely on fixed price contracts. In addition, the reliability of demand forecast allows
the regulator to better assess the actual efforts of the operator to improve efficiency and to lower
the information rent potentially available to the operator (i.e. the pure profit that the operator can
obtain from its superior knowledge of costs and traffic type when compared to what the regulator
knows) and the incentive rent (i.e. the gains that may be obtained from saving on the cost of the
efforts needed to meet the efficiency requirements built in the concession contracts).
An alternative strategy for the regulator is to come up with a regime that requires a minimum
of information on demand. For toll roads and airports runways, Engel et alt (1997a & b,  1998)
suggest a  new  type of  auction  which  consists  in  selling  the toll  or  fare  and the  investment
obligations  and  to  allow  for  variable  duration  so that  the  effects  of  demand  uncertainty  are
eliminated. The contract ends when  to the operator has recovered  its  investment at the set toll
level. It protects against over and underestimates of demand. The mechanism is quite creative and
useful although it faces its own share of problems and should reduce the need assess demand from
the view point of a regulator. (see Tirole, DeRus and Nombela). In practice, it is very unlikely that
a regulator will ever have to ignore the interactions between its regulatory choices, the economic
environment of a project, including the determinants of costs and demand and the outcomes. 9
The problem is the most acute when risks are significant and there is a problem in attracting
potential bidders. In this context, some type of cost-plus form of regulation which allows better
risk sharing should generally be preferred. The main concern under this regulatory regime is that
operators will cheerfully endorse the overshooting of actual demand since it justifies  investments
to be included in their asset base. If tariffs are set and demand is overshot, operators are simply
likely to get more time to recover the costs. This last problem is compounded in cases in which the
government structures the privatization around some payment to the public sector by the operator
and is thus concerned with maximizing the fiscal payoffs of this privatization. In this context, the
payment to the government will be highest when the potential value of the business is highest. This
is why the calculation of the minimum price a government is willing to accept for a "privatized"
asset is such a strategic variable. For a given asset value, the valuation of the business is essentially
driven by a demand forecast which both the operator and the government  have an  incentive to
overestimate. The better the demand prospect, the highest the minimum price the government can
hope for.
2.3 The relevance of the actor's strategic behavior
Whatever the regulatory regime selected, many of the players have a strong incentive to play
strategically. Politicians  will want  to  look  good  during  their  tenure  and  support  policies  that
maximize short run fiscal payoffs and/or minimizes tariffs. They can do so quite consciously and
knowing perfectly  well  that  requiring  high  payments  and  expenses  from  the  operators  while
imposing low tariffs are generally not consistent and sustainable policies. Willingness or ability to
pay and hence the real potential value of a business are seldom analyzed very analytically in this
context.  The political  gain for them to  announce a new infrastructure is much  higher than the
political loss of having to increase taxes; furthermore these concerns and the eventual renegotiation
of the deal is left to their successors since they generally imply political costs. But it is clear that
private operators happily play in this game. For many of the best deals, their main concern is to get
The regulator can be a little bit less concemed with  the risk that  the operator undershoots  demand  and that  users do not  get what they want
initially. If willingness to  pay is demonstrated, operators are quite likely to make the additional investment  requirements ad regulators will simply
have to ensure that there is no abuse in the pricing of the new service.5
the contract signed by the government, knowing quite well that there is generally significant room
for renegotiation. Patience in this field is often rewarded once the contract is won.
In sum, there are enough reasons and there is enough evidence to argue that in the context of
privatization, it is not easy to achieve convergence on the views of what a good demand forecast
should be because both firms and government have some interest in playing strategically with the
demand forecast. This should make a convincing case to ensure that regulators do their best to
come up quite early on in their tenure with independent assessments of demand. This assessment
will be useful at almost every stage of a regulator's activity. Demand is important in most types of
conflicts that have to be resolved through tariffs or quality adjustments. Demand is important when
assessing  financial  support  requirements  for  projects  requiring  subsidies.  Demand  is  also
important in understanding the distributional consequences of any regulatory decision. Demand is
finally important every time there is a renegotiation and this means it will often matter because
most contracts end up being subject to some degree of renegotiation.
3. How to deal with a wrong demand forecast?
As most policymakers will acknowledge, there  are always many ways of getting any
policy decision wrong. In the case of demand forecasting, there are some clear patterns. It may
be useful to briefly review them since a better understanding of these recurring mistakes may be
a good place to start improving demand forecast. One way of approaching the problem and to
track the reasons for the importance of demand forecasting is to assess the consequences from
the viewpoint of the main characteristics of a transport system and in particular the changes in
this system to meet the expected demand.
Investment for significant infrastructures are quite slow and costly and at some point it is
necessary  to try to take bets on growth prospects in demand. If these bets are unfounded, it can
be quite costly. Forecast can either be too optimistic or too conservative. Figure 1 summarizes
the main problems resulting from the mismatches between demand and supply for capacity and
the main suggestions discussed in this section.
3.1. How to  deal with an overoptimistic demandforecast
Before getting into demand overestimation, it may be worth to  point out that many
casual observers may easily be misled  into seeing an overoptimistic forecast where there is
nothing but  prudent long term  planning! Consider the case of  airports, roads  or ports.  The
investments needed to achieve the right medium to long run capacity are huge but mostly slow
and bulky (indivisibilities result in lumpy investments!). It will generally be impossible for most
of these types of infrastructures to  design a  flexible piecemal investment strategy to  adjust
quickly to increases in demand for capacity)-justifying  the presence of a single operator. In
many  instances,. beltways  or  urban  access  roads  have  been  build  with  assumptions
underestimating growth patterns. Because of the nature of the investment process, most of these
projects require some short run excess capacity to be able to absorb the longer run demand.
These are not mistakes. The main policy question here is whether to allow the tariff today to
cover the needs of tomorrow or to have the government pre-finance these future capacity needs
through subsidies. This is not a demand forecasting problem-since  it is foreseen-- but it is a
pricing problem very similar, although different from the one resulting from a sheer forecasting6
mistake in the context of a fixed duration contract build around  specific demand and related
return assumptions.  10
Figure  1: Problems  with  demand  forecasting
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But  mistakes  do  happen  and  there  is  enough  experience  to  benve  opto argue  that
overoptimistic demand forecasting is common. For instance, traffic forecast for some of the most
publicized  toll  roads  projects  overshot  actual  traffic  from  25%  (Cuet  n  avaca-Acapulco  in
Mexico) tos  an mucrs  60% (M1  -MI 5 Highway in Hungary or the average for the Mexican toll
road progrna).  Most of Asia's BOTs projects for toll roads were based on very optimistic growth
assumptions pre-dating the fallout at the end of the 1  990s.
A wonderfully detailed review of the mavelopin countries a  n 8 US  cities by Don
Pickrell (1992) provides similar evidence. It shows that the forecast that led local goveorments
to  advocate  10 rail  transit  projects  over  competing  less  capital  intensive  options  grossly
overestimated rail transit ridership construction and underestimated rail construction costs and
operating expenses.  In 7 out of 8 cities, actual ridership was less than half of its forecast level.
Skamris and Flyvberg (1997) provide a useful survey of the few publications documenting cost
overruns and overoptimistic forecasts. Their conclusion is that traffic forecasts that are incorrect
by 20-60% compared with actual developments are common  in large transport infrastructure
projects in a sample of countries including developing countries  and the UK, Denimark and
10  Of course, the most cynical  among our readers will try to argue that overoptimistic forecasts will eventually become realistic forecasts if
demand  is  given  enough  time  to  grow  to  be consistent  with  the  size  of the  project.  Once  more,  whenever  possible,  this  is what  makes  variable
duration  contracts  attractive  since  they  require  a less  precise  forecast  of demand.
IIPickrell,  D.H.  (I1992)7
Sweden. 12Excess capacity is indeed resulting in a renegotiation of many road contracts in Latin
America and East Asia1 3 the users or the providers. It is for instance, difficult to re-use a railway
or an airport runway and yet the builders have to be compensated. This is why to the extend
possible, when demand is hard to  forecast, it makes sense to try to  follow a  progressive or
piecemall approach to  investment. But  this  advise can  be  hard  to  follow  (indivisibility of
investment).
3.1.1. Why does overinvestment arise?
The first reason in the context of privatization is that one of the 'changes often brought by
the private operators is the introduction of cost reflecting prices and a switch from taxpayers to
users for the responsibility to pay for the service and an increase in prices.'4 If users are sensitive
to prices, a regulator would want to know how much.  Users shop around. If the use of toll roads
is deemed too expensive, users look for free alternative itineraries-this  is why the existence of
substitutes must be  reflected in  the demand forecast.  But these  changes are also  important
because they influence available income and this in turn  appears as the income effect in the
demand estimate.  Income elasticity also matters and this is too often ignored by governments
and regulators. In sum, users are often more sensitive to prices and to  "income effects" than
expected. This  is  why  when  there  is  no  or  little tradition  of  payment  of  fair  prices, the
introduction of efficient pricing policies can result in significant trend changes and the past is a
poor indicator of the future. Since many planners rely on trends to forecast demand, this can lead
to significant overestimates.
3.1.2 What can a regulator do to deal with an overoptimistic  forecast?
When the  contract  duration  is  fixed-i.e.  cannot  be  changed  without  penalties or
renegotiation--, the main option is to cut tariff or and subsidize the operator. From an efficiency
viewpoint-i.e.  to  ensure  that  resources  are allocated  to  their  best  use  and that  costs  are
minimized--, tariffs  should be  set  at least to  the short run  marginal cost. From  a  financial
viewpoint, this is not good enough since it does not allow the recovery of the costs of capital and
hence results in a deficit. On the other hand, trying to include investment amortization in the
tariff results in a demand inconsistent with the investment made-i.e.  a lower demand than what
the government may want to cover. This means that the optimal tariff reduction or subsidy will
depend on the specific objective of the government. This objective will have to be spelled out
for a regulator to be able to act in this kind of situation in a manner consistent with the political
preferences without threatening the commitments made to the private operator.
One option is to allow the use of two part tariffs designed to allow the recovery of both
operational and capital costs. The idea is to set a unit price equal to the short run marginal cost
and at the same time to levy a fixed charge to recover the capital cost.15 In practice, this is done
12 Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997)
13 .In  most cases, the outcome is a longer contract and/or some explicit subsidy. Changes in tariffs are not that politically acceptable and hence
more seldom used. But it may be useful to remind the reader that the renegotiation is not necessarily a proof of failure. In many instances, it
means a better use of new information. In a nutshell, when considering  the winners and losers of the renegotiation, the experience suggests that
the users are often winners when they can get a bener service from the private operator. The govemment ends up somewhat of a loser as they end
up having to continue financing the sector through subsidies more than they had expected. In net terms however, the sector represents a lower
burden on public funds than when the government was operating the sector.
14 This is why prices often increase initially, but they will often increase as a result of clauses in contracts that allow the adjustments to changing
macroeconomic conditions. Many private operators for instance will claim the right to  be able to pass through variations  in exchange rates or
increases in inflation through tariff increases.
15 From a more conceptual viewpoint, this allows a recovery of the cost from the consumer surplus.8
by thinking of the infrastructure as a "club" and have frequent users pay an annual fee and then
have them pay the marginal cost every time they use the facility. Occasional users who are not
members of the "club" end up paying a higher usage fee every time they use the facility. This is
in  fact  how many  governments finance  their  toll  roads.  What  is  labelled  a  subsidy  may
sometimes be simply seen as a pass through of the revenue from the vehicle owners licence fee
that  finances  some  of  the  fixed  costs  of  facilities.  This  device  is  mainly  used  for  rail
infrastructures and seaport traffics.
What is interesting from the viewpoint of the government concerned with the risks of
having to pay subsidies, is that this pricing strategy can allow the operator to explore alternative
forms of price discrimination between its users. It can recover the fixed part of the tariffs by
differentiating it enough and  adjusting it to the willingness to pay of all potential users. This
tariff discrimination allows the recovery of a  larger share of the investment than a flat fixed
charge would allow. The rule would be as follows. First, identify the various user groups. Second
set the fixed charge in relation to the degree of "dependency" the users have on the service. The
groups most dependent on the service provided-i.e.  the groups with the demand least elastic to
prices-- will be charged the most-e.g.  truckers who need to minimize transport time and cannot
use alternative longer and slower roads. The groups most likely to drop out of the market when
tariffs are too high-those  with a demand most elastic to prices-will  be charged the least-e.g.
tourist who can also enjoy the scenery on the slower road. This is not as simple as it seems. For
instance, the trucker working for an exporter of time sensitive merchandise may seem to be a
"captive"  client  of  the road,  but  if  the  fixed  charge  becomes  too  high,  it  may payoff  to
subcontract with a rail company. Similarly, it may be useful to be able to differentiate between a
tourist and a commuter to charge more from the commuter but few politicians would take such a
decision with impunity.
3.1.3  Politics  vs. economics
The  main  problem  with  these  solutions  is  in  fact  not  technical  but  political.  The
policitican will not hurt commuters who are likely to represent its electorate and make life easier
on tourists. For most politicians, a good tariff design is often like a good tax design: it exports the
burden to non-voters. So what can be done in the case of an overoptimistic forecast? The answer
is a bit cynical. First, if the earnest goal of the government is to minimize subsidies, it should not
give up considering price discrimination. It "simply" requires a little bit of creativity and a strong
commitment. Second,  if this  does not  work, subsidies are the  most  likely outcome.  In this
context, the two part tariff idea is  useful because it allows a better targetting of the subsidies.
The government should focus its subsidy on part or all of the fixed part of the tariff. Often, in
this context, to limit the costs of subsidies, the government will have to replace the willingness to
pay concept by an ability to pay concept. This allows a focus of the subsidies on the share of the
fixed part to that would have accrued to the poorest users of the infrastructure to ensure the need
to achieve a financial balance does not result in an exclusion through prices of the poorest users.
Finally, if this does not work or is not enough, an extension of the contract duration, or a slower
investment requirement will generally do the trick. In fact, the Engel et alt (1997, 98) mechanism
which avoid setting the term of the concession contract granted to an operator would avoid many
of these problems...  .although not necessarily all of them.9
3.2. How to deal with an overpessimistic demandforecast?
Undershooting demand is less common in the general context of transport privatization
but it does happen and it is hence worth discussing briefly. In case of an overpessimistic forecast,
the main outcome is a lack of transport capacity and hence congestion.This can be quite dramatic
in the short run when it is impossible to revise investment plans to adjust quickly to the larger
than expected demand. This is a common problem in urban transport modes, metro rides are
often underestimated at peak time,  urban access roads in  many of the largest urban centers
witness permanent traffic jams  at rush  hours and  in  some  cases  throughout the  day  as in
Bangkok.
3.2.1.  Why does underinvestment arise?
Underestimation arises for two main reasons:  (i)  privatization changes the perceived
transport services, changing the nature  of the  demand and (ii) the reformers have failed to
recognize the network aspects of the demand. The first effect is quite well documented in several
of the suburban rail  concessions in  Latin America where  demand was underestimated quite
significantly. The  main  reason  for  the  underestimation  was  that  most  policymakers  were
concerned that the potential passengers of the privatized services would be reluctant to pay for
what they use to get for close to nothing. The source of the underestimation was the failure to
recognize the existence of a rationed demand for quality. The passengers are actually buying a
different transport product because they now get a safer, timelier and more reliable service.
There are many instances in which the demand for a specific mode is also suprisingly
stronger  because  the  supply  of  another  mode  is  deteriorating  unexpectedly  or  faster  than
expected.1 6 More generally, when a forecaster at the project level does not take in account the
interactions with a much wider transport network, it is easy to underestimate the derived demand
stemming from the network characteristics of a transport system. Since the network externalities
can go either way the sign of the correlation between the various modes is not always the same.
An improvement in a bus system may improve the demand for train or for subways if it fucntions
as a feeder as in many of the Brazilian Northeastern large cities. If these characteristics are not
accounted for, demand will generally be underestimated and underinvestment or underpricing are
the likely outcome. Implicit subsidies are created which can be addressed through changes in
pricing  strategies  which  account  for  the  complementarity  of  transport  services  and
infrastructures.
3.2.2 What can a regulator do to deal with an overpessimistic  forecast?
If for whatever reasons, demand is temporary or occasionally stronger than expected but
a long term adjustment in capacity is not needed, the short run solution generally recommended
by economists is a temporary rationing through prices. This means that prices have to increase to
ensure that demand falls to meet the available supply of infrastructure. The problem is more
complex when recurrent or lasting congestion appears. One solution then is to set the toll or tariff
equal to the long run marginal cost  plus a  markup to  reduce demand. The revenue from the
markup over and above what should be the optimal price can be signficant if it is not dissuasive
enough and could be allocated to finance new infrastructures. Part of the demand may disappear
as a result of this pricing strategy and never return if the prices are not adjusted down again.
16 The  underestimation  of demand  for a mode can mean  the overestimation  for a competing  mode....10
This also illustrates the importance of serious cost-benefit analysis in projects  which detailed
analysis of willingness to pay under various environments.
The problem with the pricing solution is a political  one in the context of privatization.
There are many episodes in which  toll  or fare increased have  lead to  riots  and regulators or
politicians are thus reluctant to engage into pricing changes that are too sensitive politically. A
more general solution that can address this problem is to avoid fixed term contracts with varibale
fares and to award variable term contracts with set fares or fares subject to minimal changes.
Under a flexible duration contract, if the demand is stronger than expected and capacity increase
is needed, the operator keeps the business for a duration that is consistent with the investment
recovery time at a given fare or toll level. This approach is increasingly popular in the transport
sector and  is the de-facto outcome  of many renegotiations  in Latin  America  as discussed in
Estache (2000).
3.3 Summing up: the needfor  accuracy
This brief overview of the various ways of getting demand forecast wrong clearly shows
that there is room  for  improvement. But  it also  shows that regulators  have at their disposal
various instruments to fix things when they are wrong and better yet to it get it right the first time
around. This is fact often the best solution. Indeed, once the government has decided to rely on
private operators to provide transport services and infrastructures, it is getting into a permanent
relationship with these private operators. Their interactions create a history and both sides build
up a reputation during the development of this  history. A government prone to mistakes will
expose  itself  to  tougher  negotiation  with  the  private  operators  and  increase  the  incentive
operators have in  contesting  regulatory  decision on  the basis  of  the doubtful  value  of their
supporting analysis. A strong regulator with a record of sound, well founded decisions will not
have to give in-complex and tense renegotiations.  Moreover, a reliable predictable regulator also
implies a lower regulatory risk. This is turns means that private capital requires a lower rate of
return and is hence easier to attract. 17 In nutshell, even if regulators have instruments that allow
the correction of forecasting mistakes, these corrections are generally not challenge-free. This is
why investing in getting it right to from the start may be the best strategy to begin with for a new
regulator. Since this means considering the construction of demand forecasting models early on
in their regulatory tenure, it is be useful to briefly review the theory and practice of demand
modeling and forecasting.
4. The main forecasting methods
As  any  basic microeconomics  textbook  would  remind  the  non-specialized  reader,  the
demand for a transport service or infrastructure is the economist's jargon to describe the measure
of the willingness to pay for this service or infrastructure. A well documented study of demand
should allow the regulator to track down how the use of these services or infrastructures  will
change with changes in the fares or tolls charged by the operator but also with the income level
of its users and with the environment in which these users function. It is quite important indeed
to  recognize that the  demand for  transport is  a  demand derived  from  the demand  for  other
activities because it is an input into these other activities. Roads, railways or ports are used by
productive  sectors to distribute products  or send staff to represent them. Individuals travel  to
work or to visit places. Few travel for the sake of travelling.
17  Alexander, Estache  and Oliveri (1999)11
All  this means that a  regulator  interested in  forecasting demand must  understand the
various sources of the demand for a specific service or infrastructure and their interactions-i.e.
the demand for metro services is influenced by changes in the bus fare; or a recession reduces
product shipments but may also employment and hence the demand for workers' transportation
as well as the average income of the potential users of the transport services or facilities. This is
quite  important when  transport  privatization  takes place  in  the  context  of  a  restructuring
economy in which severe industrial and employment adjustments result in dramatic shifts in the
nature, composition and level of the demand of transport.
While the demand for transport can be studied at the very aggregated level and the level of
expenditures allocated to  the transport sector in the macroeconomic accounts provide useful
information on  overall trends,  it will generally not be  sufficient to  generate the information
needed by a transport privatization commission or regulator. The analysis of the demand for
transport required to simulate the effects of various combinations of quality of service (travel
time,  frequency, coverage, reliability,...)  and  fare or toll  levels or  to  assess  the impact of
regulatory  decisions requires  a  much  more  "microscopic"  study  of  a  specific  geographic
network. It will have to be designed to the allow the assessment of the network effects of the
various combinations of prices and quality considered by the government on traffic levels for
each mode for each segment of the network while accounting for a large number of specific
socio-economic characteristics or similar determining factors. In general terms, these factors are
all picked up in the various stages of the classic transport modeling efforts.
The "classical" theory supporting the modeling of transport demand for a specific transport
infrastructure or service has a strong microeconomic foundation, that is a strong concern for an
understanding of the specific factors that influence users of transport infrastructure or services. It
is however framed into a more general framework which reflects the strong influence of more
traditionally engeneering approach to the processing of data. It starts with a clear assessment of
the area to be covered by the transport service under study. The next stage is to divide this area
into various zones and to collect detailed information on each one  of these zones. This data
includes population levels, activity types and levels, employment, commercial areas, educational
and recreational institutions,.. .and a detailed analysis of the travel patterns and preferences of the
users. The information is then processed in 4 stages to determine transport demand: generation of
trips, distribution of trips, modal choice-which  is where most of the economic underpinning of
demand modeling is introduced--and route selection. 18
Although in theory  all types  of transport demand can be  conceptualized this  way,  in
practice, however, the approach has been essentially followed for urban transport, and to a lesser
extent for intercity rail passenger travel. Moreover, the analysis of demand for other transport
infrastructures or services has generally focused more on the analysis of modal choices and in
some cases of route allocation, the stages at which the key variable relevant to a regulator such as
quality are explicitly adressed and the stage at which actual demand models are estimated. This
classical model is slowly being adjusted by practitioners to better reflect the activism of users.
When congestion is an issue, a research field is  to also model explicitly the preference for the
choice of departure or arrival time of  the users. In  addition, there is  a recognition that the
generation and distributional choices are increasingly complex in many instances as the options
are increasing (probably most importantly the recreational options).
Table I synthetizes the classical steps of demand modelling  and the main regulatory each
stage can adddress. Annex 1 provides some insight into each of these steps. The more analytical
18  This  approach is most typically associated with the  forecast of passenger transport demand  but conceptually  it can easily be adopted to
describe the various stages of the determination of freight  transport demand as well even if there are very few studies  which have done so
explicitly.12
aspects  of the various  stages of the  classical  transport  model  are presented  in the Annex  inspired
by  Ortuzar  and  Willumsen  (1994)  . While  these  stages  are  still the  norm in the  sector and  many
extensions  are  still  finding  their  way  in  the  applied  litearature,  they  have  serious  limitations
which  cannot  be ignored.  For instance,  the idea of showing  the transport  problem  as a sequence
of 4 sub-models  implies an order which  is not necessarily  realistic.
Table 1. The "classical"stages  of the idenfication of the demand for transport
Stage  Transport  decisions  Policy  and  Regulatory  Issues  Modeling
in the context  of privatization
Trip  generation  How  many  trips does  the user based  in  Is there  an obvious  unmet  Land  planning
some  specified  location  wants  to take  willingness  to pay for  and  zoning
in day/week/month?  improvements  in services
which  could  be met  by a new
project  or a concession  to
improve  existing  services?
Trip  distribution  Where  is the user going  with  each  trip  What  would  be the optimal  size  Origin-
among  all possible  destinations  of  of the project  to be packaged  Destination
interest  to the transport  service  for  private  sector  participation? matrix
provider?
Modal  distribution Which  transport  mode  does the user  What  price-quality  combination Demand  models
adopt for  each trip? What  are the  should  the privatization  -Agreggated
factors  influencing  that  decision  and  commission  aim  at and  how  -Disaggregated
to what extent  much margin  should  the
regulator  give  to the private
operator  to adjust  price and
quality  given  the overall
objectives  of the
"privatization"
Also,  how much  coordination
is needed  between  different
modal  regulators  (if these  are at
different  government  levels  for
instance)
Route  allocation  6Which  route  between  the origin  and  How do pricing  (including  Network
the destination  does  the users  pick  access  pricing)  and quality  simulation  models
under  various  typcs  of service  rules influence  the efficient  use
packages?  (most  important  for  roads  of the transport  infrastructure?
and  rail)
A  more  modem  vision  is now  increasingly  common  and  recognizes  that  the  behavior  of
users  needs  to  be modeled  as economist  would  tend  to recommend.  This  vision  must  allow  for
changes  in opinion  with  changes  in transport  characteristics  (e.g.  congestions)  and  it must  allow
for  flexibility  in the  face  of very  different  time  and  data  constraint.  As  illustrated  by  the  next
section,  the most  effective  practioners  seem  willing to learn  from theory  and  improve  their  odds
of successful  demand  forecasting.  This  is clear in the modeling  of demand  in the railways  sector
and  in  urban  transport.  Some  of  the  sectors  seem  to  be  more  resistant  to  make  the  most  of
opportunuties  offered  by  theory  focusing  instead  on  increased  sophistication  in  data  analysis
through  econometrics  and  expert opinion  as is the case  in the ports  sector and  to  some extent  in
the airport  sector (see section A.3. 1. of the annex).13
5. Demand forecasting in practice
This  section  describes some  case  studies to  illustrate  the  ways in  which  regulators,
privatizers or planners have used the various  demand forecasting described in the annex. It
covers examples in which demand forecasting is used in activities which were privatizes as is the
case for the Mexican suburban rail and the French toll roads. It also presents cases in which the
public sector is still very much a key players as for the Spanish airports and the Belgian ports. In
some instances, the experience with the use of modem demand forecatsing techniques is too
recent to be able to do a  post-mortem  comparing forecast and realized but since to the extent that
they signal a trend characteristic of their specific sector, the exemples are quite informative. To
the extent possible, the process and the degree of  use of the information generating by the
forecasting teams is discussed to  illustrate the importance of the political decision to use the
information for its relevance in the regulatory process.
5.1 Mexico City Commuter Train Project'9
This case is a textbook approach to demand forecasting. 20 It involves a decision in 1998 to
invest in a commuter rail line to reduce pollution and congestion in Mexico city. Over 70 percent
of the Mexico city transportation market traveled exclusively by road in 1994 when out of 20.5
million total weekday trips, buses accounted for 48%, cars 24% and metro 2%. Two or more
public modes were used by 22% of the travelers. The main concern was to forecast how effective
the  commuter rail  would  be  in  capturing  a  sufficient  share  of  this  market.  The  demand
projections would be used to increases the transparency of the prospects to any potential private
investor but also to develop the capital and operating program for the commuter service, the
financial analysis which would eventually be used by the regulator to estimate the requirements
of financial support by the government.
The data available was reasonable although not perfect. The forecasters could rely on a
1994 survey of trips origin and destinations in Mexico city conducted by the Mexican National
Institute of Statistics.  They also has estimated trip growth rates to allow an update of the matrix.
These growth rates  (1.2% average  annual from  1994-2030) is based  on  population  growth
estimates  and  land  use  trends.  Data  on  the  characteristics  (trip  time,  costs,  frequency,
reliability...)  of bus, commuter rail and metro travel in Mexico collected by a local consulting
firm and a couple of traffic counts at key locations in the corridor. The forecaster then conducted
a  stated preference survey of potential commuter rail users to  estimate users preferences for
alternative public transportation modes. The demand is based on diversion from other modes of
public transportation only (buses and metro). It excludes diversion from cars (to get a  lower
bound) and  ignores  induced demand  as well. The results  are then introduced  into a  model
generating trip volumes for the  commuter rail.  It  includes up  to  2030  estimates of  annual
passenger demand, annual passenger-kms, demand on weekdays and weekends and boarding and
Based on: Mercer Management Consulting (1998), "Commuter Rail Demand Study for the Buenavista-Huehuetoca Line", prepared for the
Mexican Communications and Transport Secretariat
20 Another,  less 'textbooks",  set of very relevant illustrations is provided by D. Pearmain (2000), "The measurement of users' willingness to pay
for improved rail facilities", in Ortuzar (2000), op. Cit.. It includes a brief survey of the UK experience with WTP methods and a couple of
examples illustrating some of the implementation difficulties of the stated preference method in the context of a variety of decisions potentially
important to regulators such as the extent which investment decisions in facilities impact on revenues.14
lightings by station.  The consultant also identified the main sources of uncertainty which could
invalidate the forecast.
The stated preference survey had a crucial role. It generated data on the preferences, recent
trips and demographic characteristics of 800 potential commuter rail users in the corridor-
including quotas for time-of-day, age and gender of users. The respondents were recruited at 16
bus stops in or near the corridor from 5 am to 8.30 pm and were offered a fee of up to 200 pesos
to participate in the interview. They were offered the option of being interviewed at their home
or and an interview site next to the bus station. On the interview day, they were guided though a
30 minutes computer-based interview.
The questionnaire was  designed to  estimate the trade-off between time,  cost  ad  other
service  factors.  It  essentially asked  the  user  to  pick  among  of  alternatives  differentiated
according to walking time, waiting time, time in mode (bus, rail, subway), total trip time, total tip
cost and total number of transfers. The experiments were customized based on the attributes of
the intercepted tip to ensure realism. The choice experiments clearly show that potential users
place different values on  walking time,  waiting time, in-vehicle time  and  transfers between
modes. They value their time at 3 to 9 pesos per hour (roughly UScts25 to 75) depending on the
use of time.  In contrast to other locations where in-vehicle time seems to be preferred to walking
time, Mexican seem to generally perceive time spent walking comparable to time spent traveling.
Mexicans prefer to spend time walking to travelling than waiting (as anywhere else). They see
transfers as equivalent to  13-15 minutes of traveling. This means that the speed advantage of
subway or commuter rail transfers is offset by 15 to 30 minutes for 1 to 2 transfers. Overall, they
prefer the commuter rail to bus or metro (but this may be biased by the perception of additional
security).
The network data is used to  assign each trip in the total market to  a specific mode or
combination of modes based on the user trade-offs between travel time, cost and modes obtained
from the survey and on the characteristics of each model. This is done for the proportion of trips
for  each  Origin-Destination  pair  that  will  travel  by  each  mode  of  transportation.  The
specification of the modal choice model is a nested logit structure with  the following mode
combinations: (1) bus only,  (2) metro  only, (3) metro and  bus, (4) commuter rail  only,  (5)
Commuter rail and bus) and (6) a commuter rail, metro and bus option. The choice of mode is
estimated separately for each trip, taking  into account the distinct preferences  of the person
making the trip with respect to age, gender and other factor.
The model is calibrated to allow the reproduction of time and cost in  1998 for buses and
metro  and  generates  a  commuter  rail  demand  for  each  average  week  day  assuming  that
commuter rail fares are set  equal to the  bus fares of 0.28  pesos/km. More  specifically, the
demand model estimates the probability that a person will choose a particular mode for their trip
for  each of more than  90,000 public  transportation trips.  This information is then  used to
estimate demand for each transportation mode for weekday demand. So for any pair of origin
and destination, it computes the total trip time, the cost and the number of transfers and on that
basis it estimated that the user will pick any one of the 6 travel options identified earlier. This
week day demand is discounted for weekends. For the subway, this is done by applying a factor
of 0.58 based on traffic counts. Annual demand is equal to weekday demand multiplied by a
conversion factor for each mode as well based on a traffic count. Prospects are quite good and
are likely to grow even better with an annual weekday demand for commuter rail services of
about 150 million passenger in 2005 getting to over 200 in 2030.
There are some serious caveats  also quite important to  assess from the viewpoint of a
regulator. There may be a certain degree of diversion from expected traffic due to increased use
of vehicle due to changes in travel habits. On the other hand, congestion may get worse and15
diversion in  favor  of public transportation  may result in  an  underestimate  of  demand. The
behavior of bus services may also have a  strong influence since they are quite an important
feeder  service.  Increases  in  waiting  time  for  bus  services  could  hurt  the  demand  for  the
commuter rail. All these assumptions can be quantified through relatively simple simulations and
allow the regulator to better assess the risk and ... compensations if needed.
5.2 Willingness  for urban toll roads in France
Toll roads have been extensively developed in France, since the 60's. Their total length
amounts to roughly 7000 km. But these toll roads are mainly  intercity motorways for which
traffic  forecasting is a rather easy task as network effects are rather small in  intercity roads;
generally speaking there is just one competitive road and the main problem is to assess the split
of the total traffic between the toll motorway and the competitive road. Furthermore, a  long
experience exists and traffic models for these situations are well calibrated and provide good fits
with the reality. This is not the case for urban toll roads, which begin to appear in the largest
agglomerations. There are few lessons from the past, and network effects are so large that it is
not at all straightforward to estimate the sensitivity to competition or complementarity between
routes. This is why the effects of the level of tolls on the traffic of the motorways have to be
much more carefully studied than for other types of roads. Currently this is done in France  by
relying on rather large econometric models. One representative exemple is now in operation in
Ile-de-France, the region which  surrounds Paris and is almost  full urbanized  with about 11
Millions inhabitants.
The models used to forecast traffic on new infrastructures in this area are classically built
on  a four steps basis. Demand data are drawn from household  surveys (16 000 households)
updated every 5 years, and provide trip matrixes for several purposes of travel: job, non job, and
for duty vehicles. The network supply is defined by nodes and arcs linking these nodes. Arcs
represents the links between each modes; they are defined by technical characteristics such as
their length, the cost and speed, safety, comfort ... While this is all quite reasonable and standard,
the details of the modeling are not always relying on the frontiers of the applier theory. For
instance, modal  choice  is taken  into account  through  a  very  crude  model. Also, for traffic
generation and distribution, the O.D matrix  is drawn from current data, and  induced traffic is
determined as a fraction of cost decrease of each O.D relation.
The traffic model is run first to  reproduce the  current situation, and  its  parameters are
calibrated so as to minimize the sum of the  square differences between present and reckoned
traffic on each link. Then the model is run with the new planned infrastructure, and it is run
several times, for different values of toll.
More precisely, traffic modelling is developped following the following  steps21
Step 0, Before the study : Setting up the traffic modelling framework  (the "Modele global
de la Region Ile de France"). This step is done by the regional branch of the Department of
Transport, which usually runs the model ; the underlying work includes gathering data on
supply (network description and encoding), demand (socio-economic characteristics of the
zones into which the total area of the study is divided) and traffic countings. The result is a
21 Drawn from "Etudes de trafic et de sensibilite au peage en Ile de France", internal document, Ministere de
l'Equipement, France (1999)16
general calibration of the parameters of the model, providing Origin-Destination matrices,
and traffics calculated by the model on each link of the network.
Step ]  . Calibration of the modelfor  the year of implementation of the planned investment.
This  calibration is  done by  the franchiser, usually the political  body in  charge of  the
Region  Ile de France or the  Department of  Transport. It  corresponds essentially to  an
updating and a fine-tuning of the previous step.
Step 2:  Analysis of how the network works. This step is a zoom of the previous step over
the area around the planned infrastructure. It is implemented by the public authority and
and is designed to  highlight  the potential problems: where is congestion, what are the
areas with low accessibility indexes... This step helps to determine the precise scheme  to
be achieved, for instance the number of lanes, the design of the interchanges...
Step 3 . Definition of the reference scenario. This step is also implemented by the public
authority .It defines the network and the socio-economic characteristics for the various key
years of the study if the planned infrastructure were not achieved. It also identifies  the
alternative investments which should be implemented,the regulatory measures needed and
their effects on the growth and structure of traffic.
Step 4:  Calculation of the traffic in the reference scenario. The outcome of this step , run
by the public authority  or its traffic consultant, is to  apply the "modele  global" to the
reference scenario. Traffics on each link and for each mode are calculated, along with
travel times, monetary costs...
Step 5 : Policy simulations. In this step the network includes the planned investment to be
evaluated ; the model is run for several key years for which there is a change either in the
network or in the demand. Comparison between steps 4 and 5 allows to set up the main
changes between the reference scenario and the planned scenario. The conclusions are both
quantitative  (the  rentability  of  the  investment,  cost  -benefit  indexes,  accessibility
indexes...) and qualitative (where does congestion remain, what are the possible effects on
the  urban  development...).  Usually the  model  is run  several  times,  each time  with a
different value for tolls. It  helps at setting the proper toll.
Steps 6 :  Interacting with the bidders. These results  are provided to  the bidders, who
achieve their own traffic study on those basis. They are allowed to suggest modifications to
the planned investment ; they achieve their own profitability study, and  deduce the toll
structure and levels that they include in their bids, as well as the possible  subsidies or
securities they ask to the franchizer.
It is clear from this process that the public authority has in Ile de France a good knowledge
of traffics and traffic modelling:  it is at the source of the data used in the traffic modelling of the
bidders;  it  operates his  own  model which  allows  to  establish  a  diagnosis  of  the  transport
problems to be solved, and to set up the possible solutions. Its expertise in this matter allows him
to audit the bids, to screen them and to rank them, to discuss with the bidders about the traffics,
the subsidies and the tolls. As far as toll  are concerned, the results generated by the model are
quite typical  results: as long as toll increase, traffic on the new infrastructure decrease. Revenues
from the toll, which are the produce of the toll and the traffic, follow a Laffer curve--they first
increase up  to  a  maximum and  then decrease.  The toll  which  maximizes revenues  for this
specific toll road system is rather high, about 1$ per kilometer.
It is possible to calculate a profitability index associated with each toll. The profitability
for the operator is maximal for the toll which maximizes revenues i.e. 1 $ per kilometer. The
collective rentability is different from the former;  it takes into account, not only the revenues of
the  infrastructure  operator,  but  also  the  consumer's  surplus  and  the  consequences  on17
environment. Collective rentability  is maximal for a toll  equal to  zero a  situation where the
highest number of users benefit from the new infrastructure. In practice the toll regulation tries to
reach a toll a bit below the toll which maximize the revenue, in order to  get a revenue close
enough  to  the  maximum  level  ,  in  order  to  make  the  motorway  just  profitable  for  the
concessionnaire, without driving too much subsidies from the government, while managing the
political sensitivity of the introduction of tolls. Increasingly also France is learning from some of
the  conflicts  it  has  gone  through  between  users  unwilling  to  pay  and  local  governments
constrained fiscally. The decisions on the tolls are now set to levels consistent with the ability to
pay of the majority of the potential users.
5.3. Forecasting Port Trafc  in Antwerp22
Forecasting techniques used in ports tend to fit into strategic planning programs. This is
important in  the context of restructuring (how many ports do you really need in your country?)
but more generally for most common evaluations of port expansion projects (e.g. new terminals,
dock, hinterland projects,...).  Most casual observers would recognize that macroeconomic trends
and reforms (trade liberalization, labor market reforms,...)  and the specific characteristics of
each  location matter  but  recent  progress  in  logistics  techniques  and  technology  are  also
revolutionizing the demand for port  activities and this needs to be  taken into account by port
regulators.
Consider the port of Antwerp. Located about 70km from the North sea, it stretches for
some 20km along the banks of the Scheldt river. It enjoys an international maritime traffic over
1  15 million tons/year, sees over 16,000 ships every year and is one of the five largest ports in the
world. It loads (about 1.6 million TEU), unloads (about 1.6 million TEU), stores, repackages,
distributes and forwards goods. It has dedicated terminals for many commodities and handles dry
and liquid bulk containers. The container traffic is about 35 million metric tons, 61% to roads
and 25% to  waterways. General cargo represents about 60% of the traffic. The port employs
almost 70,000 people. It is subject to a strong competition from various ports in the Hamburg-Le
Havre, a critical fact which makes forecasting all the more important.
Antwerp has been forecasting traffic formnally  since the late 60s. The Transport Economics
Department of the University of Antwerp has been very active in helping the port authorities
with the management of the port in general but in particular with these forecasting efforts.  This
is coordinated in fact by a special unit of the port, the Study centre for the Expansion of Antwerp
(SEA).  SEA  has  generally  had  a  very  clear  preference  to  prepare  a  base  forecast  to  be
complemented by  more  detailed  information  and  insights  to  be  provided  by  experts.  This
approach is quite common in OECD ports and this is why it may be worth to describe it in some
detail.
The whole exercise is based  on a base model used to forecast for two main commodity
groups, bulk traffic and general cargo. An optimistic and a pessimistic variant differentiated by
the forecast of macroeconomic conditions in the OECD countries are worked on for a series of
specific traffic group. Bulk traffic is divided into 10 standard categories (agriculture, food and
food stuffs, solid fuels, crude oil and products, minerals and ores, metal products, raw materials,
fertilizers, chemicals and machinery and vehicles not included elsewhere). Initially, for general
cargo, loadings and unloadings, were pooled together and an aggregate figure was forecasted.
22 This section is based on , Coeck, C, A. Verbeke and W. Winkelmans (1996), " Back to the Futute: an Evaluation of Traffic Forecasting
Techniques used in Antwerp and Rotterdam", pp. 3-26 and Verbeke, A, E. Declercq and D. Teurelincx (1996), "The future growth of contained
traffic in the Port of Antwerp", pp 51-70, both in Winkelmans, W. and T. Notteboom (eds), The issue of prognoses in maritime transport and
seaport production in Belgium and Poland: a conceptual and empirical study,  Garant, Leuven, Belgium18
Since  1985 they  have  been  disaggregated  and  analyzed  for  both  containerized  and  non-
containerized traffic. The analysis of the disaggregation of cargo looked into imports and exports
figures for the country, transshipments and transit figures and origin/destination relations.
Forecast consists essentially of extrapolations provided by an econometric modeling of the
historical traffic.  The main explanatory variables for the future of traffic are taken to be: (i) the
general business cycle and trends variable in Belgium (the evolution of the share of exports and
imports in GDP and the evolution of industrial production) and a similar variable in a large range
of trading partners (an index of GDP in the EEC, the USA and Japan), as well as international
trends  in  containerization,  the  specific  variable  depends  on  the  traffic  to  forecast;  (ii) the
competition (remember that there are many competing ports close by); (iii) the microeconomic
features that make the port interesting for specific traffic (it is the second petrochemical port in
the world for instance).
The 1996 Masterplan for the port shows how the quantitative part of the forecast was made
for every major traffic groups. For general cargo, the variable used to pick up the business cycles
and trends is an index of GDP in the developed world (EEC, USA and Japan). For bulk cargo,
the  driving  force  is  assumed  to  be  industrial  production  in  the  EEC.  For  both  cases,  the
importance of competing ports in determining prospects is taken in the Hamburg-Le Havre range
which covers all the major competing ports. It is summarized into Antwerp's market share in this
corridor. The plan also presents a qualitative forecast. It covers an assessment of general cargo
traffic disaggregated into specific commodity groups (iron and steel, non-ferro metals, fertilizers,
wood products, vegetable and fruits, grains and animal fodders, rolling material, flowers, sugar,
food and other. For bulk traffic, the experts are asked to  consider ores, solid fuels, grains and
animal fodder, fertilizers, sand, crude oil and chemical products (including petro-chemical).
Overtime the quantitative models'  performance disappointed  and it became increasingly
used  only  to  supplement  a  more  qualitative  approach.  Indeed,  the  quantitative  model  was
overestimating  quite  significantly  (between  16.5%  for  general  cargo  and  37.3%  for  total
seaborne cargo). The qualitative method generated an underestimate of 1.6% for 1985 when it
was first used (with a deviation of +9.1  % to -14,6% for different targeted activities). This is why
the qualitative approach is in fact used to generate information which is then built-in the more
aggregate quantitative forecast of the demand for port services (in terrns of tons) .
But  forecast modeling  is an  evolving science  also  in ports  and the  amazing growth in
containerized traffic is generating interesting progress in the field as seen in the case of Antwerp
as well. The initial step is to estimate how the overall macroeconomic prospects  influence the
overall general cargo traffic (defined as conventional cargo traffic + container traffic + roll-on-
roll-off traffic) in the competitive region (i.e. the Hamburg-Le Havre market segment). This is
taken to follow a simple trend in which  an increase in  1 point in an index of the world GDP
results in an increase of 2.307  in general cargo traffic in the corridor (but this effect is reassessed
every year using the latest information available on the linkages between the two variables). The
future  containerization  rate  is  the  next  aspect  forecasted.  It  is  also  an  extrapolation  but  it
recognizes that the degree of containerization is limited and the growth will eventually start to
decrease. This drives the choice of the functional form to a semi-logarithmic function (i.e. the
degree of containerization (Y) is explained by the logarithm of a time trend (T): Y=.61+.04 InT)
but the specific parameters of this equation are picked by experts rather than simply estimated
analytically  from  past  data  . Jointly  with  the  first  step,  it  yields  an  overall  regional
containerization forecast which is an average figure since the experts recognize that its evolution
will vary for the various  departure/destination  combinations. This  is then used to  generate a
traffic  forecast for containers in the corridor. In  1996, it was expected to increase  from  140.6
million tons in 1995 to 184.5 in 2000 and 227.5 in 2005.19
The assessment of the market share of the port of Antwerp is then needed before coming
up  with  its container traffic  forecast measured  in Twenty Feet Equivalent Units (TEU), the
standard measurement  unit  for  container  traffic.  For  the  1996 Master  plan,  the  working
assumption was that the market share of the port of Antwerp would remain the same at 18.4%.
This results in a forecast of traffic increase from 25.8 million in 1995 to 33.9 in 2000 and 41.9 in
2005.23
To most purist, this is a very subjective approach to forecasting. But it is worth recognizing
that this is how it works in many places. Most port projects which these authors have had to
review followed the line described here. It is obvious that the analytical part of the project is
weak.  The quantitative methods used  did not  work but  it is  very  likely  that they could be
improved with recent development in the analysis of time series. In the short run however, the
proof is in the success of the forecast. The forecast reported here were made in  1996. They
resulted in an underestimation since actual total container traffic had reached 35.4 million tons at
the end of 1998 already.
5.4. The  forecasting  of Traffic in Spain's Airports 24
In Spain, the forecasting of air traffic is done by a public entity, Aeropuertos Espafioles y
Navegaci6n Aerea (AENA). The process is itself revealing and involves many of the approaches
discussed earlier. Demand is forecasted quite technically at the airport level but the aggregate
demand is the result of meetings of all the airport managers who decide collectively on the future
investment needs and allocation. In general, the demand forecast distinguish between short run,
medium run and peak traffic. Peak traffic forecast is needed to know when and what to do with
prices in the short run to adjust demand to capacity. These estimates are compared with estimates
made by users of the airport services to test for their robusteness.
Short run  forecast  is  based  on  time-series techniques-moving  averages, exponential
smoothing and ARIMA models. They are designed to  generate forecasts learning from past
forecasting mistakes. They generate monthly estimates for a 12 months period for national and
international traffic for all airports. Medium and long run forecasts are based on econometric
models which reflect the complex interactions between mutliple variables. These are used to
make forecast to 5, 10 and 15 years horizons. Figure 2 shows how AENA proceeds to come up
with these estimates. This is done every year during the first quarter of the year.
Figure 2 shows that the forecast is based on past traffic trends but also on regional, national
and international determinants of business cycles but also on the tourist traffic, the possibilities
of substitutes offered by other transport modes and airport specific characteristics including  the
number of airlines present in each airport, their capacity, the size of the planes reaching each
airport and their  degree of occupancy. It  also  shows that the  specific forecasting process is
actually done in two stages.
23 This is equivalent to about  3.1 million containers measured in TEUs (divide the volume expressed in 1000 tons by the average tonnage of
TEUS (twenty feet equivalent unit) that were loanded and unloaded)
24 This section is based on Trujillo and Jacob (1999)20
Figure 2: The process of forecasting demand for the medium and long run at AENA
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The first forecasts national and interational  passenger traffic independently as follows:
A  national
PAXDOMt = kpAXDOMt  _ I  cc P_IBespt  /3 PIBregt  9
•  International
PAXINTt = kPAXINTt  - I T PIBespt 0 PIBint "  (TURt Lv
where,
PAXD and PAXINT are national and international passenger traffic respectively; k  is a constant
factor and cc 8  d  z,  0,  2 ,u  are the elasticitis to the key explanatory variables which include
PIBesp,  PIBreg,  PIBint  the  variables  reflecting  national,  regional  and  international  GDP
repectively and TUR which reflects the number of tourists, the degree of occupancy of hotels, the
average stay duration, ....... )
In a second stage, the regulator constructs a model to forecast the airplane traffic for each
destination, relying on the passenger forecasting models just described:
A4ER, f,= PAXj  ,IVTA4j, ,FOi, 1)21
where AER is the volume of airplane traffic, PAX  is the volume of passengers traffic estimated
in  stage 1, TMA is the average  size of  airplanes, FO  is the occupacy rate, j  is the traffic
segment-national  or international. The model is quite effective. Forecasts done in  1997 for
1998 was only 0.13% off.
For the longer run (over 15 years), AENA relies on the Delphi technique, . the subjective
method described earlier. First, AENA selects a representative sample of experts to consult. Next
it  prepares  an  initial  questionaire  submited to  these  experts  for  comments.  The  corrected
questionaire is then sent to the experts to obtain their first individual estimates.These experts are
then fed the results and the process is reiterated as long as needed to obtain a convergence of
views.
AENA also makes forecasts for peak demand.  This is important because AENA tries to
minimize the number of peridos during which capacity is idle. In order to  design its pricing
policy to meet this objective, it needs to have a reasonable forecast of the distribution of peak
demand over time and space. Both for passengers and airplace peak demand estimates, the model
estimate related peak demand to annual traffic in the following way:
(PHP IPT)%  = K(PT-)
where, PHP is the number of passengers at peak time and PT is the number of total passengers.
This aspect is unfortunately not very successful because the airlines are not too concerned
about  it. Indeed, the  share  of  airports costs in  total  costs  is  quite  small for  most  airlines.
Moreover, for airports with a strong tourist clientele, the demand is quite insensitive to price and
this makes it very difficult to rely on prices to adjust to the  "use of the capacity" to demand.
Excess demand and excess capacity continue to be a problem in practice (AENA, 1999).
6. Practical tips to come up with a useful forecast
Generally, forecasting in transport is based on a combination of various methods. Table 2
summarizes the main steps to follow in picking a method. This is of course a very rough set of
tips but they are based on common sense for situations in which most regulators are faced with in
developing countries.
Table 2 . Tips on getting rough forecasting right
Before  study
*  Past trend  analysis
*  National  and international  economic  developments
*  Competition  from close  substitutes
*  Forecast  made  by transport  service  companies
*  Expectations  of traffic  published  by complementary  industries
*  Forecast  of peak  periods
*  Technical  development  of transport  means
•  Check out  the budget  constraints  for the demand  study
*  Check  on data availability  to decide  how  much  to invest  in data
After  the study
* Comparison  with  traffic  experienced  in similar  situations
. Elasticities  of traffic  to prices
. Achieve  sensitivity  and risk analysis22
6.1 Before the study
To begin with, it is generally useful to have look at the past trend of the type of trip the
analyst is expected to forecast. Quite suprisingly, this can be a challenge as the quality of data
available  from  transport  ministries  has  tended  to  deteriorate  over  the  years.  Assuming that
enough data can be collected, it it is generally not a good idea to stop there.It is worth finding out
more about the economic context  in  which the transport project  under  regulatory  scrutiny is
operating. The national and international environment often have an impact of these projects. So
do the development of alternative transport options which can be a complement or a substitute.
This can help the regulator decide if a quick decision is necessary. In West Africa, Senegal, Mali,
Ivory Coast and Guinee currently have a portfolio of competing rail and road projects for which
the rate of return and hence the possibility of attracting private financing is directly related to the
speed with which the governments willmake the decision. Demand will go and mostly be locked
in the hands of the first movers. Many of the key decision makers have a hard time appreciating
the importance of speed for the demand for their transport services because they are not paying
enough  attention  to  what  their  neighbourghs  are  doing.  The  surprising  fact  is  that  this
information is relatively easily available  to a  regulator or a policymaker  since most  of these
projects are generally government initiative and are quite widely publicized. Moreover, many of
the transport service companies interested in these deals have at least preliminary forecast which
can provide good insight on the real prospects of a proposed investment project. It may be worth
for  regulators  to  find  out  more  of  these  and  to  have  them  audited  independently.  Finally,
complementary industries such as aeronautic or car builders also make their own forecasts for
obvious reasons. All these are useful in educating a regulator in an initial stage.
Once these indicators  of trend or prospects  are internalized,  it is often useful to  try to
identify potential peak demand resulting from exceptional circumstances which may justify fast
increases in capacity than these trends would require.  A city trying to sell itself as an great host
for conferences must have the  supporting transport infrastructure to deal with  associated peal
demands. Tourists airports also face a strong seasonality in peak demand. How much of these
peaks  the government  is willing to  address through  increases  in  capacity and how  much by
allowing occasional congestion is a local choice--and it may make sense for a government to live
with  occasional or  even  seasonal congestion  problems rather  than  overinvesting  under  tight
budget  constraints.  The  fact  is  that  the  regulator  must  be  aware  of  the relevance  of  these
occasional demand shocks in its assessments of the performance of the operators. They will often
have the option of considering the introduction congestion pricing. If demand is in fact very little
sensitive to prices in peak periods, it may pay off not to adjust capacity and to rely on prices to
deal with peak demand.
Next, the  regulator  must ensure  that  technology  developments  are not  interfering  with
demand forecast. For instance, the appearance offastferrys  reduced the demand for conventional
ferrys  and this could result in unexpected shifts in demand as well as in financial drama for the
operators of conventional ferrys. In the crossing of the Channel bewteen France and the UK, the
introduction of new fast boats has resulted in a loss of traffic for trains riding through the tunnel
and contributed to the well publicized financial troubles encountered by the tunnel operators.
Similarly, expansions in capacity can also influence demand. For instance, the introduction of
post  panamax  ships  with  a  larger  capacity  to  carry  containers  changed  many  investment
decisions in ports since new technological constraints were appearing.
Finally, the regulator must look at its budget envelope. Most modern forecasting methods
are quite expensive and to do a decent job, it is not uncommon to have to spend over $100,00023
on  a  demand  study. How  to  pick  a  method  also  depends  on this,  as  much  as on  the  data
availability and the type of mode the regulators is focusing on.
Assuming that  money  is  not  an  issue,  in  addition  to  the  specific  traffic  type  to  be
forecasted and the specific type of nfrastructure concerned, the ideal model will depend on a data
availability,  on  how much  detail  is  needed  and  on  the  specific  goals  of the  forecast. Data
provided by the historical operators of the service will help. For the most aggregated data this is
generally possible but for more detailed data this can be a problem. Indeed, many operators will
consider a lot of the relevant information to be confidential and would see as a threat to their
commercial viability the obligation to disclose some data on their markets and clients. But on the
other hand, precisely in the context of privatization, demand studies should be undertaken with
the historical operator in preparation for the valuation of the assets to be "privatized"; this will
also constitute a good initial data base for a regulator. In most countries, a useful compelemtn is
data  published by  public  (statistical  offices)  or  private  entities  monitoring  the  sector. It  is
surprising to causal observers the number of think tanks or private survey firms collect and sell
relevant information collected through regular surveys. Finally, all this can be compelemented by
data produced through field surveys. The enthousiams for revealed and stated preferences is also
generating vasts databases which often end up under a pile of dust after their initial use. A better
organization of data bases should allow these surveys to become good sources of information to
any regulator. Ultimately, the choice of methods will be driven by the data availability and for
many of the most promising methods they new surveys are the way to go and do not require
more than a couple of  months to collect field data.
While data matters,  the amount  needed depends  often on  how much details  are really
needed from a regulatory viewpoint The devil can often be in the details but the cost of a survey
is directly related to the level of detail that is needed. Of course, this depends on the questions at
stake . If the concerns of  the regulator  is the potential  payoff  from  the  addition  of  service
requirements such as  a toilet or a  business center  in a train  station, there  are not too  many
alternatives to targetted field survey. But in many more general issues regarding prospects, fairly
aggregate data can be sufficient as seen in the case of the port of Antwerp. The fact is that often
the specific concerns are not well defined and this can results in wastes of time  and resources.
Targetting the issues also allow a better targetting of the data requirements and hence the design
of demand studies  and the choice of a methodolohy that meet their purpose in the most cost
effective way.
6.2. After the study
Once the study is done, the job is not over. First, it makes sense to ensure that the validity
of the results of the study can be  assessed. A first benchmark  consist in a comparison with th
results  experienced  in  similar  situations  elsewhere.  It  is  of  course  difficult  to  find  exact
comparability but the "distance" between the situations can be evaluated and provide an idea of
the "distance" between the results. It is often useful to request from the consulting team doing the
analysis to  provide a survey of their  own studies or  similar  studies. This  information should
include a review of  the elasticities of traffic to prices and cross-price elasticities when substitutes
or complements are involved. In this context, conventional wisdom can also help and surveys can
be consulted to provide first order estimates. 25 Last but not least, the study should provide a point
estimate of  course, or  at least  a  narrow range.  But  it  should also  indicate how is  the traffic
modified  under  different  assumptions  for the  exogeneous  parameters,  such  as  value  of time,
25 For instance  Oum,Water  and Yong (1992)  and Small  and Winston  (1999)24
economic growth, petrol price, rate of exchange...The  specific number of parameters should be
picked by looking at the number of likely regulatory issues that are likely to emerge and for which
regulator is likely to have to set conflicts.  Safety, service quality and  environmental issues are
likely to arise and hence making sure that the appropriate elasticities are provided as part of the
study for future uses.
7. Conclusions
Forecasting has long been a challenge. It will continue to be one for the foreseeable future.
But  the  analytical  instruments  and  the  data  processing  capabilities  provided  by  the  latest
technologies and softwares should allow much better forecasting than is observed in transport
ministries  or regulatory agencies.  Privatization  induces new needs  for demand  forecasting; it
leads to pay more attention to  risk than it is the case when investment is publicly  financed.
Furthermore the regulator has to be able to judge the traffic study made by the operators, and to
find  out  the  strategic  behavior  which  influence  these  studies.  For  many  governments  and
regulators the decision to avoid good demand modeling is driven by a lack  of conviction that
theory and  models can do better  than  the "old-hands"  of the  sector. But  this  is particularly
dangerous  in  situations  in  which  the  nature  of  the  business  is  changing  as  a  result  of
privatization. Another argument is that it is too costly. The fact is that for projects adding up to
over US$ 100-200 million, a cost of US$ 100-200,000 should not be a reason to reject some effort
to do reasonable modeling.  In some cases, the forecasting firms are willing to sell their forecast
with an insurance in case of  significant gaps between forecasts and occurrences! These recent
developments have to be balanced against the fact that bad forecast can result in rationing of or
excess  capacity  which  are  not  costless  either.  Subsidies  are  often  a  necessary  outcome.
Moreover, they can ruin the credibility of a whole concession program: a much costlier but often
underestimated consequences of demand forecasting failures.
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ANNEX 1: The four stages of the classical model and their meaning for regulators
A.1 Trip generation models.
There are two main types of trip generation models. The first is the aggregated one which
is essentially what the first generation of demand modelers focused on at a very aggregated level,
the  second  is  the  most  disaggregated  approach  which  tries  to  model  more  explicitly the
individual preferences. The aggregate model often provides a useful first order approach which
eventually needs to be confirmed by more detailed studies.
A. 1.] The Aggregate Approach.
The  aggregate  approach  determines  the  average  number  of  trips  for  the  population
concerned  by  the  project  and  some  type  of  extrapolation  of  that  information  is  used  to
forecasting medium to long run demand. This extrapolation has taken increasingly sophisticated
forms and accounted for an increasingly large number of factors to explain future trip generation
and hence demand. In general, the number of trips on any corridor between a specific origin and
a specific destination (i.e. a road project or a rail project) will be explained by variables such as
the  level  or type  of activity  or  any  other relevant  general characteristic  of  the population.
Consider the case of a railway company.
The general analytical form is expressed as follow:
T, = k,rjuaf,
in the case of a project concerning mostly passengers, these variables would mean
Ti  the average number of trips taken the potential transport users during a given unit of
time  (day/week/month) is the  average  number of trips  per  unit  of time  of the
population of the city or neighborhood i.
ri  is the average per capita income of the potential transport users
fJ  can be any additional relevant factor such as the ownership of a own vehicle in the
cases of urban transport models,
k. a et b  are parameters
In practice, this provides a useful first order idea of get an  idea of the future demand.
Extrapolating the values of r and f  gives a first order of magnitude. It easy to  come up with
because a lot of the required data is relatively easy to come by. In the case of trains for instance,28
most public enterprises record a significant volume of data on volume carried, number of trips
and the main characteristics of the largest clients for freight passengers or reasonable surveys of
their client base. It is generally not sufficient to do much more than a valuable input into a more
sophisticated analysis of prospects.
A. 1.2 Disaggregated models
The second type of model is disaggregated and focuses on the individuals trip generation
characteristics.  The  users'  population  and  its  movements  are  divided  into  homogeneous
categories within which there is some degree of forseeability in the trip types and numbers. For
instance,  residence-office,  work-related  trips,  private trips  for private  business,  week  end
leisure trips and  holidays leisure trips.  The users of the transport service can then be classified
according to more specific criteria:  income,  household composition and size, age, ownership or
not of a vehicle, employment type and location characteristics.
The distinction into these various categories is important since it determines the various
elements a private operator may consider in discriminating prices across users and usage types,
explicitly through the design of tolls or other prices, or implicitly, through targeted discounts to
frequent  users. From  a  mode political  view  point,  it  is  also  important  to  use  this  kind  of
information to ensure that the poor are not penalized as users.  26
From a  regulator's  viewpoint,  their  value is  quite significant  in particular  in  an urban
transport context since it provides a snapshot of the users' constituency of this regulator. This in
turn is likely to be critical information in most instances of conflicts between service providers
and users. Indeed, the valuation of the service will significantly be determined by their individual
characteristics  and  differences  across  users  are  important  to  understand  for  any  referee  or
arbitrator which the regulator often is.
A.2. Trip distribution models
The  distribution  is  the  stage  allocating  traffic  from  a  center  to  the  various  possible
destinations  and  its  use  in  the  context  of  specific  projects  considered  in  the  context  of
privatization is  mostly concentrated  in urban  issues. An  intercity  road  or  rail project  have
In practice, these models suggest great constancy of total daily urban or suburban trips (on average 3.5 per day per person for the last 20 years
around Paris and between 3-2 and 2.4 in the country side). The main change is taking place in the modal choice with a significant increase in the
use of cars. Motorized trip vary  between  1.7 and 2.1  per day-increasing  with  the distance from the center (LEFEVRE et OFFNER (1990)).
Also, while these studies in France also show an increase in the average length of the trip, the speed also increases.29
essentially one destination, even if it possible to consider the inclusion of feeder services for
other regions or connections opportunities. In many developing countries, the value of a road
considered for private tolling depends on the existent of a supporting public network to enhance
the commercial value of the private road. In many contracts in fact, concessionaire will demand
the construction of this feeder road and the failure to do so is a reason for contract renegotiation
(see Malaysia example). This  is why the overall vision of an origin distribution important is
generally important, even if it is true that it is significantly more important in an urban context.
Conceptually, an origin-destination matrix is almost always derived from a gravity model
which can be justified in many ways and specified in almost as many forms. The oldest and best
known is:
T~k(Pi  pi
and:  - Tij is traffic from i toj
-Pi et Pj are the potential users in i and j (e.g. population, number of firms)
- dij is the distance between i and j
- a et b are parameters
Some of the problems of this model is that its does not address differences in socio-economic
profiles or differences in the economic nature of the firms covered (industrial, service,...?).
In practice, since most estimates suggested that the value of a is I  and for b around 2, a
more general formula is:
7, = kO,  Djf  (co)
and:  - O  is an "emission factor with origin i
- Dj is an attraction factor by destination j
-f  is a decreasing function
- Cij is the generalized cost of trips between i and j
An unconstrained version of this model allows a good estimate of the elasticity of demand
to transport costs and deals with both trip generation and distribution. It is quite common for
inter-urban traffic studies. But the model can be  subject to various types  of constraints (e.g.
limiting the total traffic and some aspects of the traffic exogeneously or limiting total costs). The
challenge is to specify a model that is well adapted to the situation to be analyzed. A wrong
specification of this part of the model can be quite dramatic not only in terms of quality of30
service to be provided to users but also in terns  of the possibilities to recover investment costs or
imposing additional congestion costs to users. Models subjects to double constraints (both traffic
exiting each zone and entering each zone are set exogeneously) are well adapted to urban traffic
and suburban residence-work trips.  The single constraints models (the sum of traffic exiting
each zone is set) is used for all other trip purposes.
A.3. The modal choice
This is the key stage from the viewpoint of demand modeling. The underlying idea is that
in many cases, demand for a  specific mode is increased by reducing the demand for another
mode. The modeling of modal choice is based on the assumption that this choice depends on the
difference-or  sometimes the ratio-between  transport costs. The general form in the case of the
choice between two modes is a-logistic-function  which gives the probability of relying on one
mode as a function of the difference between these two costs.  27:The intuition is thus quite
simple, the users goes for the most cost effective way of getting the kind of service needed.
While other formula can generate the same type of outcome, this one has the advantage that it
can be derived from an explicit modeling of the economic behavior of an individual-a  discrete
choice logit model.  The real  challenge is to  decide whether to  implement the model at the
aggregate or disaggregated level.
A. 3.1 The aggregate models
The aggregate approach uses very aggregated information to describe the behavior of large
groups of users (passengers, tons of products transported between two cities in a given transport
mode), generally over  time  (dynamic  concerns)  and  sometimes  across  regions  (geographic
concerns). The behavior described is thus the average behavior without consideration to  the
relevance of the diversity of behavior. The analyst focuses on data made of an origin-destination
pair and on the share of users relying on a specific mode in the total population. The demand is
eventually assessed by recognizing that it depends on the usual relatively standard factors such as
prices,  the  price  of  substitutes,  quality  and  relevant  socio-economic  variables  taken  from
macroeconomic accounts. This kind of model is for instance used to assess the distribution of
Pr(l) =  I  ,where:Pr(l)  is the share of use of mode I, Cl et C2 are the generalized costs of each one of the two modes-the
I+ expu(C,  - C, )
generalized cost isthe  sum of the cost of using the mode and of the value of the time needed to get from origin to destination and p  is a positive
parameter which drives the sensitivity of the modal choice to the differences in costs.When the value of  p  is infinity, the choice is one of all or
nothing. When it is 0, the modal choice is insensitive to costs.31
traffic between day and night by railways companies or to model allocation between public and
private vehicles in urban settings. These models are generally too aggregate to meet the needs of
a regulator but  they are used anyway because they can provide useful  initial insights. What
matters from the viewpoint of a regulator is that the cost account for many of the variables that
will be subject to regulatory supervision such as tariff/tolls or government control such a fuels
but these are seldom take into account in a sensitive enough way to be useful because they do not
account well enough for the different characteristics of the various types of users.
The main aggregate methods can be classified in 2 groups: qualitative or intuitive methods
and "mathematical or statistical" methods. Among the qualitative methods, it is worth pointing to
a series of techniques based on expert assessment or field surveys of expectations designed to
complement the quantitative estimates. The expert assessment is least refined since it assumes an
expert can assess the impact of mutliple factors on a potential new business environment-since
in the context of privatization, new business opportunities are typically being created.
Field surveys of expectation are targeted to anyone who can be affected by the project and
is in a priviledged position to assess the prospects. A refined version of these surveys is provided
by the techniques called Delphi, where the experts forecast and get a feed-back on the results
from the full sample of people surveyed allowing a series of iterations until some degree of
convergence is achieved. This approach is used by IATA or EUROCONTROL for instance for
airline traffic forecast. These techniques can be useful at the national or regional level but are
unlikely to be useful to forecast traffic and traffic risk on a given corridor. Finally, the technique
of brain-storming, quite common in socioliogy, consists in putting together a group, for instance
users, and through in a series of question to be discussed by the group. This technique is used by
Puertos del Estado in Spain complement the more analytical forecasts of the spanish ports.
The more quantitative methods to forecast aggregate demand can be classified into: trends
extrapolations-assuming  a linear, exponential, quadratic or some other function that seems to fit
past observations well--, fancier time series analysis and more sophisticated econometric work.
Extrapolation is the weakest but also the most commonly used around the world. The future is
assumed to be determined by what happened in the past.  It is mostly useful for very short run
needs and has a better chance of working on monthly data than on annual data. But this is32
limiting since for many sectors it is very likely that at some point changes in trend will occur.28
The main  problem is that  with  monthly  data,  seasonal effects are  likely  to  arise and  better
techniques are needed. Some marginal statistical improvements (moving averages over several
months  to  smooth the  series from  its  seasonally or a  better  analysis of the  statistical model
explaining the growth rate, e.g. exponential vs. linear) are common for short term forecasting. At
best these methods can be used to inform or complement more sophisticated work.
Time  series statistical  methods (e.g. Box-Jenkins)  are a major  improvement  over these
approaches because they use the information more effectively and can be used to explain trends
through a much more detailed assessment of the behavior of time series over time. They have a
weak economic theory foundation and hence are more difficult to use in the context of structural
changes such as a privatization. They do not  leave much room either  to model incentives or
regulatory influences on patterns and trends.
Statistical  methods  can  be  divided  into  models  of  growth  factors  and  econometric
modeling. The growth factor models assume that the demand for transport is quite simply and
directly related to specific economic indicators. Statistical correlations provide the basis of the
identification of the indicators that need to be picked.  Assumptions on the growth rate of these
indicators  drive  the  forecast  of  the  demand  for  transport.  In  general,  the  best  inputs  are
indications of the growth in physical outputs that will need to be transported. When these are not
available, income, employment or population provide approximations of the driving forces. Once
more,  this  mode  is  much  too  aggregated  to  be  useful  to  most  regulators  or  privatization
commission. It does not do much more than provide a glorified trend.
The aggregate econometric models are probably the most  useful  tools in  this category.  They
allow the recognition of the fundamental relations between the demand for transport and a large
number of economic, social and political factors. They can be based on studies of historical time
series, cross sections (i.e. a number of cities, a number of users at any point in time) or panels of
data  (which tracks  the evolution  over  time  of  a  cross section).  For readers  unfamiliar  with
econometric techniques,
28 This  can be picked  up by a modified  exponential  (traffic  = k. + a.b  i...e with  a<O  and b<l), a logistic  (I/traffic = k. + a.blif'e ) or33
A.3.2 The disaggregated models
While the aggregated model focuses on the average choice for a given origin-destination
pair, the disaggregated models focus on the specific choice of each users. The data observed is
the choice of an individual user and the "pleasure" ("utility" in economics jargon) generated by
each mode  is reflected in a (logit) function which related this pleasure to the price of the mode,
time spent and any other relevant characteristic of the individual or mode.
u,  E pt  XI  E  29
and:  i:  is the individual,j:  is the mode, k:  represents each of the k relevant characteristics of
the pair (i, j) for each individual (while for aggregated models, the average of the population is
enough),  A,  : are parameters and E  is simply an operator saying that the "utility" is determined
by the sum of all the relevant variable weighted by the parameters estimated from the samples
surveyed and  e,  :are random shocks influencing utility which need to be modeled explicitly.
The  specification  of these  random  shocks  is what  differentiates  models  and  determines the
specific econometric technique that must be used to derive demand. They often depend on the
nature and the degree of precision with which the data is collected. The lack of realism of the
specification can be a problem in practice and generate counter-intuitive results as discussed in
Quinet (1998). This is why the way the information is collected is something the regulators must
under as well as possible. It will drive their ability to be a fair referee.
The basic information can be collected in two main types of ways: revealed preferences
and declared/stated preferences.  Revealed preferences are provided by a direct observation of
the behavior of transport service users. They do what they prefer to do. This means that the
regulator only needs to get data on the current use of transport services and/or infrastructure. The
main  problem  is that  it may not  provide  enough  variability  in  the  information to  do  good
statistical work. Moreover , it is often difficult to isolate all variable relevant to a regulator.
Gompertz function (In traffic =  In  k.  + .b"". In  a).
For instance, the choice between bus and cars can be modeled in a logit as follows
Pb'  =  ,  ,  ,where  PJ is the probability of choice of bus,  Ca, Cb are the monetary costs of cars and buses for all users,
i is the  individual and 0 are constants;  if bus  fares increase by  dc . the probablity  of taking  the  bus changes  by  b  = Pb  (1-Ph )P 1;
dc
Individual i picks modefover  a if:  C'  <  C'  that is, if hi <
ti  - t34
Declared/stated preferences are provided by responses given by a sample of potential or
actual users provided when they are placed  in hypothetical situations. The potential users are
asked to  rank,  rate or pick among several options.  This  is generally  organized through  field
surveys  conducted  around  the  area  in  which  the  benefits  of  a  project  are  supposed to  be
observable. Asking users to pick or rate is faster and generally more reliable than asking for a
ranking and is hence more common. T he interview can be conducted in 10-  1  5 minutes-it  takes
at least twice as much to ask for a ranking of options. The specific design has of course to be
tailored to the type of mode in use. You have more time to interview a passenger on an intercity
train than to ask the driver of a car waiting for the light to  turn green. In some instances, the
survey requires the users to be paid to come to a specific location to do the questionnaire.
Overall, the declared preferences approach is to some extent less demanding initially. It is
however very sensitive to the quality of the questionnaire design and to the quality of the team
conducting this field survey. It needs to be tested carefully as errors are easy-and  common. For
urban projects, it is recommended to have sample sizes of the population of about  10% when
passenger  flows are  larger than 900  pax/hour-and  assuming  a  response  rate of  20-30%. It
generally ends up being more  expensive than a revealed preference study. The list should make
it clear that this is quite time consuming and requires a strong commitment to success.
While the economists have all the required tools to derive individual demand forecast from
these models, they  are not  cheap to  implement.  They are indeed quite  time  consuming  and
demand strong technical  skills. These models require detailed  surveys through  questionnaires
and econometric analysis-which  quickly drive costs up. Their main attraction is that they can
be quite effective at allowing an estimate of the probabilities that an individual with  specific
characteristics will  prefer  one  mode  over  another.  To  get  the  demand  for  each  mode,  this
individual information are aggregated.  This also can be done in various ways. each introducing
its own biases which must be understood if the results are to be used in any regulatory decision
(Ben Akiva and Lerman 1985).
The  quality  of  the  policy  advise  generated  from  these  models  have  made  become  a
standard in the industry. They are being used in assessing projects in various  Latin American
countries at reasonable costs and some of these examples will be discussed below. One of their35
useful adaptations is the inclusion of a constraints that recognizes quite explicitly that ability to
pay matters in making choices. 30
A.4. The choice of itineraries
These models are mostly used for the road sector. Without saturation, it is very similar to
what  was  discussed  earlier with  respect  to  modal  choices.  With  saturation-i.e.  when  cost
depend on traffic levels--, the modelers need to implement the two Wardrop principles. The first
principle states that  in equilibrium, the  generalized costs  of every itinerary used between  an
origin and a destination given are equal or lower than those of any unused itinerary. The problem
can now  easily  be  modeled  thanks  to  major  progress  in  computer  technologies.  The  main
problem is that this is an optimum only from the view point of the individual user and in fact the
second Wardrop principle suggests that the collective optimum is unlikely to be consistent with
this  individual optimum. What this  means  is that  regulators must  understand the sources  of
indifferences before deciding how to intervene. This is particularly important because one f the
main policy conclusion derived from the analytical developments surrounding these principles is
that the best solutions are not always what they appear to be. More specifically, the best solution
to saturation is not always more investment but can include various types of price, rationing or
queuing arrangements.
In  comparing  alternatives  between  a  short  saturated  itinerary  and  a  long  unsaturated
itinerary, it is important to consider that displacement effects resulting from an improvement in
one route may simply maintain travel costs constant. (Ville 1970). Indeed, users will shift to the
short way until congestion increase travel  time  while the users  of the  long  itinerary see not
change. This  can be  exacerbated  by  a  situation  in  which  a  regulator  accepts  to  reduce  the
frequency of public transport on the long itinerary to pay for the investment made to expand the
short itinerary or as part of a negotiation with the concessionaire of this short itinerary.
30 Price time models can also be used to pick itineraries or to model air-rail competition and hence can be useful to any regulatory or competition
agency. They assume that a user i decides as a function ofthe  generalized cost for each mode: C'  =P,  +hi t,  =  Pa, + hita
where: C',  C'  are the generalized costs for modes a andf;  pa et pf  are the prices of each mode;.t.  et tf are the travel time, hi is the value of
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